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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that 
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and ecoriomic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dyna, .  ical systems. 
The  research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Tecllnological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to weave together the new theories and empirical evidence 
analyzing firms and industries in motion, or what has been termed as indusby demographics. 
In particular, the links between the technological regime underlying an industry and the 
observed patterns of industry demography are emphasized. Although a major conclusion of this 
new literature is that the structure of industries is perhaps better characterized by a high degree 
of fluidity and turbulence than stability, the patterns of industry demographics vary 
considerably from industry to industry. And what apparently shapes the evolution of firms 
particular to a specific industry is, as much as anything else, the knowledge conditions shaping 
the technological regime underlying that industry. 
1 Introduction 
Schumpeter (1 942, p. 132) predicted that, due to scale economies in the production of 
new economic knowledge, large corporations would not only have the innovative advantage 
over small and new enterprises, but that ultimately the economic landscape would consist only 
of giant corporations: "Innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is 
increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is 
required and make it work in predictable ways." Certainly the perceived economic threat posed 
by the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s was attributable to its ability to 
concentrate economic assets and exhaust scale economies to a degree that was unthinkable in 
the West, where a commitment to political democracy seemingly translated into a concomitant 
commitment to economic decentralization. 
Perhaps the ascendancy of industrial organization as a field in economics during this 
period came from the recognition not only by scholars but also by policymakers that industrial 
organization matters. And it became the task of the industrial organization scholars to sort out 
the issues involving this perceived trade-off between economic efficiency on the one hand and 
political and economic decentralization on the other. The scholars of industrial organization1 
responded with a massive literature focusing on essentially three issues: (1) how much 
economic concentration is there?, (2) what are the economic welfare implications of an 
oligopolistic market structure? and (3) given the evidence that economic concentration was 
associated with efficiency, what were the public policy implications? A characteristic of this 
literature was not only that it was obsessed with the concentration/oligopoly question, but it 
was essentially static in nature. There was considerable concern about what to do about the 
firms and industrial structures that existed, but little attention paid to where they came from 
and where they were going. Oliver Williamson's classic 1968 article, "Economies as an 
1 This literature is best documented in Scherer and Ross (1990). 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs," became something of a final statement 
demonstrating this seemingly inevitable tradeoff between the gains in productive efficiency that 
could be obtained through increased concentration and gains in terms of competition that could 
be achieved through decentralizing policies, such as antitrust. But it did not seem possible to 
have both, certainly not in Oliver Williamson's completely static model. 
Yet what has become striking about the industrial structure of the United States is not 
its stability, but rather the opposite -- its dynamic, turbulent nature. According to Business 
Week, "In recent years, the giants of industry have suffered a great comeuppance -- as much 
from the little guys as from fierce global competition. IBM continues to reel from the assaults 
of erstwhile upstarts such as Microsoft, Dell Computer, and Compaq Computer. Big Steel was 
devastated by such minimills as Nucor, Chaparral Steel, and Worthington Industries. One-time 
mavericks Wal-Mart Stores and The Limited taught Sears, Roebuck a big lesson. Southwest 
Airlines has profitably flown through turbulence that has caused the big airlines to rack up $10 
billion in losses over the past three years. And a brash pack of startups with such names as 
Amgen Inc. and Centocor Inc. has put the U.S. ahead in biotechnology -- not Bristol-Myers, 
Squibb, Merck, or Johnson & Johnson. 
The industrial landscape of the United States has been radically transformed in a 
relatively short period of time. A number of corporate giants such as IBM, U. S. Steel, RCA 
and Wang have lost their aura of invincibility. Only slightly more than a decade ago Peters and 
Waterman, in their influential best-selling management book, In Search of Excellence: Lessons 
from America's Best Run Companies, identified IBM as the best-run corporation in America 
and possibly in the entire world. At the same time has come the breathtaking emergence of new 
firms that hardly existed two decades ago, such as Microsoft, Apple Computer, Intel, Dell, and 
Compaq Computer. In the 1950s and 1960s it took two decades for one-third of the Fortune 
500 to be replaced. In the 1970s it took one decade. By contrast, in the 1980s it took just five 
years for one-third of the Fortune 500 firms. 
Perhaps even more impressive than the handfbl of new enterprises that grow to 
penetrate the Fortune 500 are the armies of startups that come into existence each year -- and 
typically disappear into oblivion within a few year. In the 1990s there are around 1.3 million 
new companies started each year (Audretsch, 1995). That is, the modem economy is 
characterized by a tremendous degree of turbulence. It is an economy in motion, with a 
massive number of new firms entering each year, but only a subset surviving for any length of 
time, and an even smaller subset that can ultimately challenge and displace the incumbent large 
enterprises. 
Despite the high degree of fluidity and turbulence in modem economies, very little is 
actually known about the dynamic process through which industries and firms evolve over 
time. Perhaps this lack of knowledge motivated Edwin Mansfield (1 962, p. 1023) some thirty 
years ago to make a plea for a greater emphasis on the dynamic process by which industries 
change over time: "Because there have been so few econometric studies of the birth, growth, 
and death of firms, we lack even crude answers to the following basic questions regarding the 
dynamic processes governing an industry's structure. What are the quantitative effects of 
various factors on the rates of entry and exit? What have been the effects of successfbl 
innovations on a firm's growth rate? What determines the amount of mobility within an 
industry's size structure?" In the intervening three decades a new literature has emerged 
focusing on industrial markets in motion. In particular, this literature examines the process by 
which new firms enter into industrial markets, either grow and survive or exit from the 
industry, and possibly displace incumbent corporations. At the heart of this evolutionary 
process is innovation, because the potential for innovative activity serves as the driving force 
behind much of the evolution of industries. And it is innovative activity that explains why the 
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patterns of industry evolution vary from industry to industry, depending upon the underlying 
knowledge conditions, or what Nelson and Winter (1982) term technological regimes. 
The purpose of this paper is to weave together the new theories and empirical evidence 
analyzing firms and industries in motion, or what has been termed as indzrsw demographics. 
In particular, the links between the technological regime underlying an industry and the 
observed patterns of industry demography are emphasized. In the following section the 
traditional static view of industrial organization provided by the literature of industrial 
economics is portrayed. The concept of technological regimes and their influence on innovative 
activity is explained in the third section. The fourth section focuses on entry, and the fifth 
section on survival and growth. In the sixth section the role that wages and non-wage 
employee compensation plays is examined. The theories and evidence is synthesized in the 
seventh section to provide a coherent model of industrial organization within an evolutionary 
framework. Finally, in the eighth section a summary and conclusions are provided. 
2 'The Static View of Industrial Organization 
Two stylized facts that have emerged from a plethora of studies pose something of a 
puzzle to scholars of industrial organization. The first, which has received considerable 
attention at least since the seminal study by Herbert Simon and Charles Bonini (1958) more 
than three decades ago, is the persistence of an asymmetric firm-size distribution predominated 
by small enterprises. Ijiri and Simon (1977, p. 2) characterize this "regularity in social 
phenomena that is both striking and observable in a number of quite diverse situations. It is a 
regularity in the size distribution of  firm^."^ In fact, virtually, no other economic phenomenon 
2 Ijiri and Simon (1977, pp. 1-2) observe that, "Nature, as it presents itslef to the physical scientist, is full of 
clearly defined patterns ... The patterns that have been discovered in social phenomena are much less neat. To be 
sure, economics has evolved a highly sophisticated body of mathematical laws, but for the most part, these laws 
bear a rather hstinct relation to empirical phenome na... Hence, on those occassions when a social phenomenon 
has persisted as consistently as the skewed asymmetric firm-size distribution. Not only is it 
almost identical across every manufacturing industry, but it has remained strikingly constant 
over time, at least since the Second World War, and even across developed industrialized 
nations (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). 
The persistence of this skewed asymmetric firm-size distribution is consistent with the 
common observation in industrial organization that the bulk of firms in most industries are 
operating at a suboptimal level of output. Building on his earlier studies on the extent of 
suboptimal scale plants and firms in industrial markets, Leonard Weiss in 1991 concluded that, 
"In most industries the great majority of firms is suboptimal. In a typical industry there are, let's 
say, one hundred firms. Typically only about five to ten of them will be operating at the MES 
(minimum efficient scale) level of output, or anything like i t v 3  Not only did Weiss find that the 
MES level of output exceeds that of most firms (enterprises) and plants (establishments), but 
that, "On the average, about half of total shipments in the industries covered are suboptimal in 
scale, and a very large percentage of output is from suboptimal plants in some unconcentrated 
industries." The persistence of what has traditionally been classified as suboptimal plants to 
dominate the firm-size distribution in industrial markets over time raises the question ~f not 
only why do suboptimal scale plants exist but how are they able to exist.4 
The second puzzling stylized fact has been established by a number of studies that have 
found that the entry of new firms into an industry is apparently not substantially deterred in 
industries where scale economies play an important role. Taken together, these two stylized 
facts raise two troubling questions, my is it that the preponderance of enterprises in virtually 
appears to exhibit some of the same simplicity and regularity of pattern as is seen so commonly in physics, it is 
bound to excite interest and attention." 
Quotation from p. xiv. of the "editor's introduction" to Weiss (1991). 
4 Weiss (1991, p. 404) observed that, "The survival of smaller plants within any given industry may be due to 
their specialization in items with short production runs or to their service of small geographic markets within 
which their relatively small national market share is irrelevant. To the extent that such explanations hold, small 
plants are not necessarily suboptimal. However, such explanations seem unlikely to hold for a number of the 
industries where the percentage of suboptimal capacity is large." 
every U. S. rnanl!jhcturii~g industry are small? and Why are entreprerrelrrs not more noticeably 
deterredporn entering industries characterized by substantial scale econonries? The 
traditional static view has been able to shed little light on resolving these two empirical 
paradoxes. 
3 Innovation and Technological Regimes 
3.1 The Knowledge Production Function 
The starting most for most theories of innovation is the firm.5 In such theories the firms 
are exogenous and their performance in generating technological change is e n d ~ ~ e n o u s . ~  For 
example, in the most prevalent model found in the literature of technological change, the model 
of the knowledge production.functiorr, formalized by Zvi Griliches (1 979), firms exist 
exogenously and then engage in the pursuit of new economic knowledge as an input into the 
process of generating innovative activity. 
The most decisive input in the knowledge production function is new economic 
knowledge. And as Cohen and Klepper conclude, the greatest source generating new economic 
knowledge is generally considered to be R&D.' Certainly a large body of empirical work has 
found a strong and positive relationship between knowledge inputs, such as R&D, on the one 
hand, and innovative outputs on the other hand. 
Audretsch (1995) proposes shifting the unit of observation away from exogenously 
assumed firms to individuals -- agents with endowments of new economic knowledge. As J. de 
V. Graaf (1957) observed nearly four decades ago, "When we try to construct a transformation 
hnction for society as a whole from those facing the individual firms comprising it, a 
5 See for reviews of this literature Baldwin and Scott (1987), Cohen and Levin (1989), Scherer (1984 and 
1992), and Dosi (1988). 
6 See for example Scherer (1984 and 1991), Cohen and Klepper (1991, 1992a and 1992b), and Arrow (1962 
and 1983). 
7 Cohen and Klepper (1 99 1 and 1992a and 1992b). 
fbndamental difficulty confronts us. There is, from a welfare point of view, nothing special 
about the firms actually existing in an economy at a given moment of time. The firm is in no 
sense a 'natural unit'. Only the individual .members of the economy can lay claim to that 
distinction. All are potential entrepreneurs. It seems, therefore, that the natural thing to do is to 
build up from the transformation function of men, rather than the firms, constituting an 
economy. If we are interested in eventual empirical determination, this is extremely 
inconvenient. But it has conceptual advantages. The ultimate repositories of technological 
knowledge in any society are the men comprising it, and it is just this knowledge which is 
effectively summarized in the form of a transformation function. In itself a firm possesses no 
knowledge. That which is available to it belongs to the men associated with it. Its production 
function is really built up in exactly the same way, and from the same basic ingredients, as 
society's. 'I 
3.2 The Appropriability Problem Revisited 
A large literature has emerged focusing on what has become known as the 
approl~riabilityproblem.8 The underlying issue revolves around how firms which invest in the 
creation of new economic knowledge can best appropriate the economic returns from that 
knowledge (Arrow, 1962). But when the lens is shifted away from focusing upon the firm as 
the relevant unit of observation to individuals, the relevant question becomes, How can 
economic agents with a given endowment of n m  knowledge best appropriate the ret~rrn~vfrom 
that knowledge ? 
The appropriability problem confronting the individual may converge with that 
confronting the firm. Economic agents can and do work for firms, and even if they do not, they 
can potentially be employed by an incumbent firm. In fact, in a model of perfect information 
with no agency costs, any positive economies of scale or scope will ensure that the 
See Cohen and Levin (1 989) and Baldwin and Scott (1 987). 
appropriability problems of the firm and individual converge. If an agent has an idea for doing 
something different than is currently being practiced by the incumbent enterprises -- both in 
terms of a new product or process and in terms of organization -- the idea, which can be 
termed as an innovation, will be presented to the incumbent enterprise. Because of the 
assumption of perfect knowledge, both the firm and the agent would agree upon the expected 
value of the innovation. But to the degree that any economies of scale or scope exist, the 
expected value of implementing the innovation within the incumbent enterprise will exceed that 
of taking the innovation outside of the incumbent firm to start a new enterprise. Thus, the 
incumbent firm and the inventor of the idea would be expected to reach a bargain splitting the 
value added to the firm contributed by the innovation. The payment to the inventor -- either in 
. terms of a higher wage or some other means of remuneration -- would be bounded between the 
expected value of the innovation if it implemented by the incumbent enterprise on the upper 
end, and by the return that the agent could expect to earn if he used it to launch a new 
enterprise on the lower end. Or, as Frank Knight (1 92 1, p. 273) observed more than seventy 
years ago, "The laborer asks what he thinks the entrepreneur will be able to pay, and in any 
case will not accept less than he can get from some other entrepreneur, or by turning 
entrepreneur himself In the same way the entrepreneur offers to any laborer what he thinks he 
must in order to secure his services, and in any case not more than he thinks the laborer will 
actually be worth to him, keeping in mind what he can get by turning laborer himself" 
Thus, each economic agent would choose how to best appropriate the value of his 
endowment of economic knowledge by comparing the wage he would earn if he remains 
employed by an incumbent enterprise, w, to the expected net present discounted value of the 
profits accruing from starting a new firm, n . If these two values are relatively close, the 
probability that he would choose to appropriate the value of his knowledge through an external 
mechanism such as starting a new firm, Pr(e), would be relatively low. On the other hand, as 
the gap between w and ~r becomes larger, the likelihood of an agent choosing to appropriate 
the value of his knowledge externally through starting a new enterprise becomes greater, or 
3.3 Asymmetric Knowledge, Transaction Costs, and the Principal- 
Agent Relationship 
As Knight (1921), and later Arrow (1962) emphasized, new economic knowledge is 
anything but certain. Not only is new economic knowledge inherently risky, but substantial 
asymmetries exist across agents both between and within firms. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1987). 
Which is to say that the expected value of a new idea, or what has been termed here as a 
potential innovation, is likely to be anything but unanimous between the inventor of that idea 
and the decisionmaker, or group of decision maker^,^ of the firm confronting with evaluating 
proposed changes or innovations. In fact, it is because information is not only imperfect but 
also asymmetric that Knight (1921, p. 268) argued that the primary task of the firm is to 
process information in order to reach a decision: "With the introduction of uncertainty -- the 
fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge -- into this 
Eden-like situation (that is a world of perfect information), its character is entirely 
changed.. . With uncertainty present doing things, the actual execution of activity, becomes in a 
real sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or hnction is deciding what to do and 
how to do it." 
Alchian (1 950) pointed out that the existence of knowledge asymmetries would result 
in the inevitability of mistaken decisions in an uncertain world. Later, Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) attributed the existence of asymmetric information across the employees in a firm as 
resulting in a problem of monitoring the contribution accruing from each employee and setting 
9 For example, as of 1993 a proposal for simply modifjring an existing product at IBM had to pass through 250 
layer's of decisionmaking to gain approval ("Uberfdrdert und Umegerbar," Der Spiegel, No. 14, 1993, p. 127). 
the rewards correspondingly. This led them to conclude that, "The problem of economic 
organization is the economical means of metering productivity and rewards" (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972, p. 783). 
Combined with the bureaucratic organization of incumbent firms to make a decision, 
the asymmetry of knowledge leads to a host of agency problems, spanning incentive structures, 
monitoring, and transaction costs. It is the existence of such agency costs, combined with 
'asymmetric information that not only provides an incentive for agents with new ideas to 
appropriate the expected value of their knowledge externally by starting new firms, but also 
with a propensity that varies systematically from industry to industry. 
Coase (1 937) and later Williamson (1975) argued that the size of an (incumbent) 
enterprise will be determined by answering what Coase (1937, p. 30) articulated as, "The 
question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the organizing 
authority?" In fact, Coase (1937, p. 24) pointed out that, "Other things being equal, a firm will 
tend to be larger the less likely the (firm) is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in 
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized." 
Holmstrom (1 989) and Milgrom (1 988) have pointed out the existence of what they 
term as a btrreaucratization dilemma, where, "To say that increased size brings increased is a 
safe generalization. To note that bureaucracy is viewed as an organizational disease is equally 
accurate" (Holmstrom, 1989, p. 320). 
To minimize agency problems and the cost of monitoring, bureaucratic hierarchies 
develop objective rules. In addition, Kreps (1991) has argued that such bureaucratic rules 
promote internal uniformity and that a uniform corporate culture, in turn, promotes the 
reputation of the firm. These bureaucratic rules, however, make it more difficult to evaluate the 
efforts and activities of agents involved in activities that do not conform to such bureaucratic 
rules. As Holmstrom (1989, p. 323) points out, "Monitoring limitations suggest that the firm 
seeks out activities which are more easily and objectively evaluated. Assignments will be 
chosen in a fashion that are conducive to more effective control. Authority and command 
systems work better in environments which are more predictable and can be directed with less 
investment information. Routine tasks are the comparative advantage of a bureaucracy and its 
activities can be expected to reflect that." 
Williamson (1 975, p. 20 1) has also emphasized the inherent tension between 
hierarchical bureaucratic organizations and the ability of incumbent organizations to 
appropriate the value of new knowledge for innovative activity outside of the technological 
trajectories associated with the core competence of that organization, "Were it that large firms 
could compensate internal entrepreneurial activity in ways approximating that of the market, 
the large firm need experience no disadvantage in entrepreneurial respects. Violating the 
congruency between hierarchical position and compensation appears to generate bureaucratic 
strains, however, and is greatly complicated by the problem of accurately imputing causality." 
This leads Williamson (1975, pp. 205-206) to conclude that, "I am inclined to regard the early 
stage innovative disabilities of large size as serious and propose the following hypothesis: An 
efficient procedure by which to introduce new products is for the initial development and 
market testing to be performed by independent investors and small firms (perhaps new 
entrants) in an industry, the successfbl developments then to be acquired, possibly through 
licensing or merger, for subsequent marketing by a large multidivision enterprise.. .Put 
differently, a division of effort between the new product innovation process on the one hand, 
and the management of proven resources on the other may well be efficient. 
3.4 The Role of Technological Regimes 
The degree to which agents and incumbent firms are confronted with knowledge 
asymmetries and agency problems with respect to seeking out new economic knowledge and 
(potential) innovative activity would not be expected to be constant across industries. This is 
because the underlying knowledge conditions vary from industry to industry. In some 
industries new economic knowledge generating innovative activity tends to be relatively 
routine and can be processed within the context of incumbent hierarchical bureaucracies. In 
other industries, however, innovations tend to come from knowledge that is not of a routine 
nature and therefore tends to be rejected b y the hierarchical bureaucracies of incumbent 
corporations. Nelson and Winter (1 972, 1978 and 1982) described these different underlying 
knowledge conditions as reflecting two distinct technological regimes -- the entrepreneurial 
and routinized technological regimes: "An entrepreneurial regime is one that is favorable to 
innovative entry and unfavorable to innovative activity by established firms; a routinized regime 
is one in which the conditions are the other way around." (Winter, 1984, p. 297).1° 
Gort and Klepper (1982) argued that the relative innovative advantage between newly 
established enterprises and incumbent firms depends upon the source of information generating 
innovative activity. If information based on nontransferable experience in the market is an 
important input in generating innovative activity, then incumbent firms will tend to have the 
innovative advantage over new firms. This is consistent with Winter's (1984) notion of the 
routinized regime, where the accumulated stock of nontransferable information is the product 
of experience within the market, which firms outside of the main incumbent organizations, by 
definition, cannot possess. 
By contrast, when information outside of the routines practiced by the incumbent firms 
is a relatively important input in generating innovative activity, newly established firms will 
tend to have the innovative advantage over incumbent firms. Arrow (1962), Mueller (1976), 
and Williamson (1975) have all emphasized that when such information created outside of the 
incumbent firms cannot be easily transferred to those incumbent ehterprises -- presumably due 
' O  See also Malerba (1991) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1993). 
to the type of agency and bureaucracy problems described above -- the holder of such 
knowledge must enter the industry by starting a new firm in order to exploit the expected value 
of his knowledge. 
While the concept of technological regimes does not lend itself to precise measurement, 
the major conclusion of Acs and Audretsch (1988 and 1990) and Audretsch (1990) was that 
the existence of these distinct regimes can be inferred by the extent to which small firms are 
able to innovate relative to the total amount of innovative activity in an industry. That is, when 
the small-firm innovation rate is high relative to the total innovation rate, the technological and 
knowledge conditions are more likely to reflect the entrepreneurial regime. The routinized 
regime is more likely to exhibit a low small-firm innovation rate relative to the total innovation 
rate. The existence of these two distinct technological regimes is documented in Audretsch 
(1 995). 
In the most innovative four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industries, large 
firms, defined as enterprises with at least 500 employees, contributed more innovations in some 
instances, while in other industries small firms proved to be more innovative. For example, in 
both the electronic computing equipment and process control instruments industries, the small 
firms contributed most of the innovations. By contrast in the pharmaceutical preparation 
industry and in aircraft the large firms were much more innovative. 
Probably the best measure of innovative activity is the total innovation rate, which is 
defined as the total number of innovations per 1,000 employees in each industry. The large- 
firm innovation rate is defined as the number of imovations made by firms with at least 500 
employees, divided by the number of employees (thousands) in large firms. The small-firm 
innovation rate is analogously defined as the number of innovations contributed by firms with 
fewer than 500 employees, divided by the number of employees (thousands) in small firms. 
The innovation rates, or the number of innovations per 1,000 employees, have the 
advantage in that they measure large- and small-firm innovative activity relative to the presence 
of large and small firms in any given industry. That is, in making a direct comparison between 
large- and small-firm innovative activity, the absolute number of innovations contributed by 
large firms and small enterprises is somewhat misleading, since these measures are not 
standardized by the relative presence of large and small firms in each industry. Hence the 
innovation rates are presumably a more reliable measure of innovative intensity. Thus, while 
large firms in U. S. manufacturing introduced 2445 innovation, and small firms contributed 
slightly fewer, 1954, small-firm employment was only half as great as large-firm employment, 
yielding an average small-firm innovation rate of 0.309, compared to a large-firm innovation 
rate of 0.202. 
In a series of studies, Acs and Audretsch (1988 and 1990) found that not only does 
market concentration negatively influence the total amount of innovative activity, but also the 
relative innovative advantage of large and small enterprises, that is the technological regime 
underlying the particular industry. Whether an industry can be better characterized by the 
routinized technological regime or the entrepreneurial technological regime is shaped by: 
1. the degree of capital intensity; 
2. the extent to which an industry is concentrated; 
3. the total amount of innovative activity in the industry; and 
4. the extent to which an industry is comprised of small firms. 
In particular, the routinized technological regime, where the large incumbent firms tend 
to have the relative innovative advantage, tends to be characteristic of industries that are 
capital intensive, advertising intensive, concentrated and highly unionized. By contrast, the 
entrepreneurial technological regime tends to be characteristic of industries that are highly 
innovative and comprised predominantly of large firms. 
4 Entry 
4.1 The Traditional View 
Coase (1937) was awarded a Nobel Prize for explaining why a firm should exist. But 
why should more than one firm exist in an industry?" One answer is provided by the traditional 
economics literature focusing on industrial organization. An excess level of profitability 
induces entry into the industry. And this is why the entry of new firms is interesting and 
important -- because the new firms provide an equilibrating fbnction in the market, in that the 
levels of price and profit are restored to the competitive levels. 
In this traditional theory, outputs and inputs in an industry are assumed to be 
homogeneous. That is, the entry of new firms is about business as usual -- it is just that with 
the new entrant there is more of it. For example, Geroski (1991a, p. 65) assumes that, "Ifwe 
think of entry as an error-correction mechanism which is attracted by and serves to bid away 
excess profits, it is natural to suppose that entry will occur whenever profits differ from their 
long-run levels. Given this maintained hypothesis, observations of actual entry rates and 
current (or expected post-entry) profits can be used to make inferences about the unobservable 
of interest -- long-wn profits. In particular, entry in an industry is hypothesized to occur 
whenever expected post-entry profits exceed the level of profits protected in the long run." 
This leads to the traditional model of entry: 
" Coase (1937, p. 23) himself asked, "A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the 
monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and 
in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all? Why is not all production carried 
on by one big firm?" 
where E,, represents entry in industry j at time t, P,, represents expected post-entry 
profits, and b; represents the level of profits protected in the long run by entry barriers bi, and 
u,, represents stochastic disturbance. In this standard model of entry, which theoretically dates 
back to Bain (1 956) and empirically to Orr (l974), A measures the speed with which entrants 
respond to excess profits, and has the dimension of a flow per unit of time. The level of profits 
which can be sustained in perpetuity without attracting entry is bj, and serves as a limit to what 
Geroski (1991a, pp. 65-66) terms as "limits profits", and is a natural measure of the height of 
barriers to entry. 
The point to be emphasized here is that this traditional model assumes that the impact 
that the new entrant has on the market, and on equilibrium price and industry profits, is 
through the additional amount of output that is contributed. And the hndamental motivation 
for entering an industry, either through a new firm or through diversified entry, as reflected in 
equation (2) , is that profits exceed their long-run equilibrium level, even after accounting for 
structural barriers to entry. 
In fact, little consensus has emerged in the growing plethora of studies trying to link 
industry profitability, growth, and structural barriers to entry rates, as implied by equation (2). 
The level of industry profitability has been found to have only a weak and sometimes 
ambiguous impact on entry.12 A positive relationship has generally been found to exist between 
industry growth rates and entry rates. Presumably higher rates of growth enable incumbent 
enterprises to raise prices, thereby inducing more entry, or else raise expectations about future 
profits. For example, in five of the six country studies (Germany, Norway, Portugal, Belgium, 
and Korea) contained in Geroski and Schwalbach (199 1) entry rates were found to be 
12 These studies are reviewed in Geroski (1995). 
positively influenced by industry growth rates. Only for the United Kingdom did a negative 
relationship emerge between entry rates and industry growth. 
One of the most startling results that has emerged in empirical studies is that entry by 
firms into an industry is apparently not substantially deterred or even deterred at all in capital- 
intensive industries in which scale economies play an important role (Austin and Rosenbaum, 
1990; Siegfiied and Evans, 1992; and Audretsch, 1995; Acs and Audretsch, 1990, chapter 
five). 
Empirical evidence in support of the traditional model represented by equation (2) is 
ambiguous at best, leading Geroski (1991b, p. 282) to conclude, "Right from the start, scholars 
have had some trouble in reconciling the stories told about entry in standard textbooks with the 
substance of what they have found in their data. Very few have emerged from their work 
feeling that they have answered half as many questions as they have raised, much less that they 
have answered most of the interesting ones." 
Perhaps one reason for this trouble is the inherently static model used to capture an 
inherently dynamic process. Manfred Neumann (1993, pp. 593-594) has criticized this 
traditional model of entry, as found in the individual country studies contained in Geroski and 
Schwalbach (1991), because they "are predicated on the adoption of a basically static 
framework. It is assumed that startups enter a given market where they are facing incumbents 
which naturally try to fend off entry. Since the impact of entry on the performance of 
incumbents seems to be only slight, the question arises whether the costs of entry are 
worthwhile, given the high rate of exit associated with entry. Geroski appears to be rather 
skeptical about that. I submit that adopting a static framework is misleading ... In fact, generally, 
an entrant can only hope to succeed if he employs either a new technology or offers a new 
product, or both. Just imitating incumbents is almost certainly doomed to failure. If the process 
of entry is looked upon from this perspective the high correlation between gross entry and exit 
reflects the inherent risks of innovating activities ... Obviously it is rather difficult to break loose 
from the inherited mode of reasoning within the static h e w o r k .  It is not without merit, to be 
sure, but it needs to be enlarged by putting it into a dynamic setting." 
4.2 The Evolutionary View 
The model proposed by Audretsch (1995) refocuses the unit of observation away from 
firms deciding whether to increase their output from a level of zero to some positive amount in 
a new industry, to individual agents in possession of new knowledge that, due to uncertainty, 
may or may not have some positive economic value. It is the uncertainty inherent in new 
economic knowledge, combined with asymmetries between the agent possessing that 
knowledge and the decision making vertical hierarchy of the incumbent organization with 
respect to its expected value that potentially leads to a gap between the valuation of that 
knowledge. 
How the economic agent chooses to appropriate the value of his knowledge, that is 
either within an incumbent firm or by starting or joining a new enterprise will be shaped by the 
knowledge conditions underlying the industry. 
Thus, when the underlying knowledge conditions are better characterized by the 
routinized technological regime, there is likely to be relatively little divergence in the evaluation 
of the expected value of a (potential) innovation between the inventor and the decisionmaking 
bureaucracy of the firm. Under the routinized regime a great incentive for agents to start their 
own firms will not exist, at least not for the reason of doing something differently. When the 
underlying knowledge conditions more closely adhere to the entrepreneurial technological 
regime, however, a divergence in beliefs between the agent and the principal regarding the 
expected value of a (potential) innovation is more likely to emerge. Therefore, it is under the 
entrepreneurial regime where the startup of new firms is likely to play a more important role, 
presumably as a result of the motivation to appropriate the value of economic knowledge; due 
to agency problems, this knowledge cannot be easily and costlessly transferred to the 
incumbent enterprise. 
Under the routinized technological regime the agent will tend to appropriate the value 
of his new ideas within the boundaries of incumbent firms. Thus, the propensity for new firms 
to be started should be relatively low in industries characterized by the routinized technological 
regime. 
By contrast, under the entrepreneurial regime the agent will tend to appropriate the 
value of his new ideas outside of the boundaries of incumbent firms by starting a new 
enterprise. Thus, the propensity for new firms to enter should be relatively high in industries 
characterized by the entrepreneurial regime. 
Thus, when the underlying knowledge conditions are better characterized by the 
routinized technological regime, there is likely to be relatively little divergence in the evaluation 
of the expected value of a (potential) innovation between the inventor and the decisionmaking 
bureaucracy of the firm. Under the routinized regime a great incentive for agents to start their 
own firms will not exist, at least not for the reason of doing something differently. When the 
underlying knowledge conditions more closely adhere to the entrepreneurial technological 
regime, however, a divergence in beliefs between the agent and the principal regarding the 
expected value of a (potential) innovation is more likely to emerge. Therefore, it is under the 
entrepreneurial regime where the startup of new firms is likely to play a more important role, 
presumably as a result of the motivation to appropriate the value of economic knowledge; due 
to agency problems, this knowledge cannot be easily and costlessly transferred to the 
incumbent enterprise.I3 
This model analyzing the decision of how best to appropriate the value of new 
economic knowledge confronting an individual economic agent seems usehl when considering 
the actual decision to a new firm taken by entrepreneurs. For example, Chester Carlsson 
started Xerox after h is proposal to produce a (new) copy machine was rejected by Kodak. 
Kodak based its decision on the premise that the new copy machine would not earn very much 
money, and in any case, Kodak was in a different line of business -- photography. It is perhaps 
no small irony that this same entrepreneurial startup, Xerox, decades later turned down a 
proposal from Steven Jobs to .. .educe and market a personal computer, because they did not 
think that a personal computer would sell, and, in any case, they were in a different line of 
business -- copy machines (Carrol, 1993). After seventeen other companies turned down Jobs 
for virtually identical reasons, including IBM and Hewlett Packard, Jobs resorted to starting 
his own company, Apple computer. 
Similarly, IBM turned down an offer from Bill Gates, "the chance to buy ten percent of 
Microsoft for a song in 1986, a missed opportunity that would cost $3 billion today."14 II3M 
reached its decision on the grounds that "neither Gates nor any of his band of thirty some 
employees had anything approaching the credentials or personal characteristics required to 
work at I I ~ M . " ' ~  
Divergences in beliefs with respect to the value of a new idea need not be restricted to 
what is formally known as a product or even a process innovation. Rather, the fact that 
economic agents choose to start a new firm due to divergences in the expected value of an idea 
- 
l 3  There is considerable evidence that geographic proximity plays an important role in the transfer of such 
knowledge (Audretsch and Feldman, 1995; Audretsch and Stephan, 1995; and Acs, Audretsch and Feldman, 
1991) 
l 4  "System Error," The Economist, 18 September 1993, p. 99. 
'' Paul Carrol, "Die Offene Schlacht," Die Zeit, No. 39,24 September 1993, p. 18. 
applies to the sphere of managerial style and organization as well. One of the most vivid 
examples involves Bob Noyce, who founded Intel. Noyce had been employed by Fairchild 
Semiconductor, which is credited with being the pioneering semiconductor firm. In 1957 
Noyce and seven other engineers quit en masse fiom Schockley Semiconductor to form 
Fairchild Semiconductor, an enterprise that in turn is considered the start of what is today 
known as Silicon Valley. Although Fairchild Semiconductor had "possibly the most potent 
management and technical team ever assembled" (Gilder, 1989, p. 89), "Noyce couldn't get 
Fairchild's eastern owners to accept the idea that stock options should be part of compensation 
for all employees, not just for management. He wanted to tie everyone, fiom janitors to bosses, 
into the overall success of the company ... This management style still sets the standard for 
every computer, software, and semiconductor company in the Valley today.. .Every CEO still 
wants to think that the place is run the way Bob Noyce would have run it" (Cringley, 1993, p. 
39). That is, Noyce's vision of a firm excluded the dress codes, reserved parking places, closed 
offices, and executive dining rooms, along with the other trappings of status that were standard 
in virtually every hierarchical and bureaucratic U.S. corporation. But when he tried to impress 
this vision upon the owners of Fairchild Semiconductor, he was flatly rejected. The formation 
of Intel in 1968 was the ultimate result of the divergence in beliefs about how to organize and 
manage the firm. 
The key development at Intel was the microprocessor. When long time IBM employee 
Ted Hoff approached IBM and later DEC with his new microprocessor in the late 1960s, 
"IBM and DEC decided there was no market. They could not imagine why anyone would need 
or want a small computer; if people wanted to sue a computer, they could hood into time- 
sharing systems" (Palfreman and Swade, 199 1, p. 108). 
While studies have generally produced considerable ambiguity concerning the impact of 
scale economies and other measures traditionally thought to represent a barrier to entry, 
Audretsch (1 995) found conclusive evidence linking the technological regime to startup 
activity. New-firm startup activity tends to be substantially more prevalent under the 
entrepreneurial regime, or where small enterprises account for the bulk of the innovative 
activity, than under the routinized regime, or where the large incumbent enterprises account for 
most of the innovative activity. These findings are consistent with the view that differences in 
beliefs about the expected value of new ideas are not constant across industries but rather 
depend on the knowledge conditions inherent in the underlying technological regime. 
5 Survival and Growth 
5.1 Theory 
The theory proposed by Audretsch (1 995) suggests that divergences in the expected 
value regarding new knowledge will, under certain conditions, lead an agent to exercise what 
Albert 0. Hirschman (1970) has termed as exit rather than voice, and depart from an 
incumbent enterprise to launch a new firm. But who is right, the departing agents or those 
agents remaining in the organizational decision making hierarchy who, by assigning the new 
idea a relatively low value, have effectively driven he agent with the potential innovation away? 
Expost the answer may not be too difficult. But given the uncertainty inherent in new 
knowledge, the answer is anything but trivial apriori. 
Thus, when a new firm is launched, its prospects are shrouded in uncertainty. If the 
new firm is built around a new idea, i.e., potential innovation, it is uncertain whether there is 
sufficient demand for the new idea or if some competitor will have the same or even a superior 
idea. Even if the new firm is formed to be an exact replica of a successll incumbent enterprise, 
it is uncertain whether sufficient demand for a new clone, or even for the existing incumbent, 
will prevail in the future. Tastes can change. And new ideas emerging from other firms will 
certainty influence those tastes. 
Finally, an additional layer of uncertainty pervades a new enterprise. It is not known 
how competent the new firm really is, in terms of management, organization, and workforce. 
At least incumbent enterprises know something about their underlying competencies from past 
experience. Which is to say that a new enterprise is burdened with uncertainty as to whether it 
can produce and market the intended product as well as sell it. In both cases the degree of 
uncertainty will typically exceed that confronting incumbent enterprises. 
This initial condition of not just uncertainty, but greater degree of uncertainty vis-a-vis 
incumbent enterprises in the industry is captured in the theory of firm selection and industry 
evolution proposed by Boyan Jovanovic (1 982). Jovanovic presents a model in which the new 
firms, which he terms entreprenezirs, face costs that are not only random but also differ across 
firms. A central feature of the model is that a new firm does not know what its cost function is, 
that is its relative efficiency, but rather discovers this through the process of learning from its 
actual post-entry performance. In particular, Jovanovic (1982) assumes that entrepreneurs are 
unsure about their ability to manage a new-firm startup and therefore their prospects for 
success (Jovanovic, 1994). Although entrepreneurs may launch a new firm based on a vague 
sense of expected post-entry performance, they only discover their true ability -- in terms of 
managerial competence and of having based the firm on an idea that is viable on the market -- 
once their business is established. Those entrepreneurs who discover that their ability exceeds 
their expectations expand the scale of their business, whereas those discovering that their post- 
entry performance is less than commensurate with their expectations will contact the scale of 
output and possibly exit from the industry. Thus, Jovanovic's model is a theory of noisy 
selection, where efficient firms grow and survive and inefficient firms decline and fail. 
The role of learning in the selection process has been the subject of considerable 
debate. On the one hand is what has been referred to as the Larackran assumption that learning 
refers to adaptations made by the new enterprise. In this sense, those new firms that are the 
most flexible and adaptable will be the most successful in adjusting to whatever the demands of 
the market are. As Nelson and Winter (1 982, p. 1 1) point out, "Many kinds of organizations 
commit resources to learning; organizations seek to copy the forms of their most successfil 
competitors." In fact, Pakes and Erikson (1 995) extend Jovanovic's original theory by 
incorporating strategies that entrepreneurs can pursue to accelerate the learning process, such 
as investing in knowledge-creation activities like R&D. 
On the other hand is the interpretation that the role of learning is restricted to 
discovering if the firm has the right st~gf in terms of the goods it is producing as well as the 
way they are being produced. Under this interpretation the new enterprise is not necessarily 
able to adapt or adjust to market conditions, but receives information based on its market 
performance with respect to its fitness in terms of meeting demand most efficiently vis-a-vis 
rivals. The theory of organizational ecology proposed by Michael T. Hannan and John 
Freeman (1989) most pointedly adheres to the notion that, "We assume that individual 
organizations are characterized by relative inertia in structure." That is, firms learn not in the 
sense that they adjust their actions as reflected by their hndamental identity and purpose, but 
in the sense of their perception. What is then learned is whether or not the firm has the right 
stuff, but not how to change that stuff. 
The theory of firm selection is particularly appealing in view of the rather startling size 
of most new firms. For example, the mean size of more than 1 1,000 new-firm startups in the 
manufacturing sector in the United States was found to be fewer than eight workers per firm 
(Audretsch, 1995).16 While the minimum efficient scale (MES) varies substantially across 
industries, and even to some degree across various product classes within any given industry, 
the observed size of most new firms is sufficiently small to ensure that the bulk of new firms 
will be operating at a suboptimal scale of output. Why would an entrepreneur start a new firm 
that would immediately be confronted by scale disadvantages? 
An implication of the theory of firm selection is that new firms may begin at a small, 
even suboptimal, scale of output, and then if merited by subsequent performance expand. 
Those new firms that are successhl will grow, whereas those that are not successhl will 
remain small and may ultimately be forced to exit from the industry if they are operating at a 
suboptimal scale of output. 
Subsequent to entering an industry, a firm must decide whether to maintain its output 
expand, contract, or exit. Two different strands of literature have identified several major 
influences shaping the decision to exit an industry. The first, and most obvious strand of 
literature suggests that the probability of a business exiting will tend to increase as the gap 
between its level of output and the minimum efficient scale (MES) level of output increases." 
The second strand of literature points to the role that the technological environment plays in 
shaping the decision to exit. As Dosi (1982 and 1988) and Arrow (1962) argue, an 
environment characterized by more frequent innovation may also be associated with a greater 
amount of uncertainty regarding not only the technical nature of the product but also the 
demand for that product. As technological uncertainty increases, particularly under the 
entrepreneurial regime, the likelihood that the business will be able to produce a viable product 
and ultimately be able to survive decreases. 
- 
16 A similar start-up size for new manufacturing firms has been found by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988 
and 1989) for the United States, Mata (1993) and Mata and Portugal (1994) for Portugal, and Wagner (1991a 
and 1994b) for Germany. 
17 For example, Weiss (1976, p. 126) argues that, "In purely competitive long-run equilibrium, no suboptimal 
capacity should exist at all." 
An important implication of the dynamic process of firm selection and industry 
evolution is that new firms are more likely to be operating at a suboptimal scale of output if the 
underlying technological conditions are such that there is a greater chance of making an 
innovation, that is under the entrepreneurial regime. If new firms successfully learn and adapt, 
or are just plain lucky, they grow into viably sued enterprises. If not, they stagnate and may 
ultimately exit from the industry. This suggests, that entry and the startup of new firms may not 
be greatly deterred in the presence of scale economies. As long as entrepreneurs perceive that 
there is some prospect for growth and ultimately survival, such entry will occur. Thus, in 
industries where the MES is high, it follows from the observed general small size of new-firm 
startups that the growth rate of the surviving firms would presumably be relatively high. 
At the same time, those new firms not able to grow and attain the MES level of output 
would presumably be forced to exit from the industry, resulting in a relatively low likelihood of 
survival. In industries characterized by a low MES, neither the need for growth, nor the 
consequences of its absence are as severe, so that relatively lower growth rates but higher 
survival rates would be expected. Similarly, in industries where the probability of innovating is 
greater, more entrepreneurs may actually take a chance that they will succeed by growing into 
a viably sized enterprise. In such industries, one would expect that the growth of successfU1 
enterprises would be greater, but that the likelihood of survival would be correspondingly 
lower. 
Summarizing these arguments, the theory of firm selection and industry evolution leads 
to the following predictions, or hypotheses, concerning the likelihood of survival and growth 
rates of those surviving new firms: 
1. The likelihood of new-firm survival should be lower in industries exhibiting greater 
scale economies. The growth rates observed in surviving firms in high MES industries should 
be greater. 
2. The likelihood of firm survival should be higher for larger firms but growth rates 
should be lower. 
3. The likelihood of firm survival should be lower under the entrepreneurial 
technological regime but the growth rates of surviving firms should be greater 
4. Both firm growth and the likelihood of survival should be greater in high-growth 
industries. 
5.1.1 Empirical Evidence 
Geroski (1995) as well as Audretsch and Mata (1995) point out that one of the major 
conclusions from studies about entry is that the process of entry does not end with entry itself 
Rather, it what happens to new firms subsequent to entering that sheds considerable light on 
industry dynamics. The early studies (Mansfield, 1962; Hall, 1987; Dunne, Roberts and 
Samuelson, 1988 and 1989; and Audretsch, 1991) established not only that the likelihood of a 
new entrant surviving is quite low, but that the likelihood of survival is positively related to 
firm size and age. More recently, a wave of studies have confirmed these findings for diverse 
countries, including Portugal (Mata and Portugal, 1994; and Mata, 1994), Germany (Wagner, 
1994), and Canada (Baldwin and Gorecki, 199 1 ; and Baldwin, 1995). 
Audretsch (1991), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata and Portugal (1994) and 
Mata (1994) shifted the relevant question away from FKhy does the likelihood of survival vary 
systematically acrossfirms? to Why does the propensity for firms to survive vary 
systematically across industries? The answer to this question suggests that what had 
previously been considered to pose a bamer to entry may, in fact, constitute not an entry 
bamer but rather a barrier to survival. The answer to this questions suggests that what had 
previously been considered to pose a bamer to entry may, in fact, constitute not an entry 
bamer but rather a bamer to survival. 
What has become known as Gibrat's Law, or the assumption that growth rates are 
invariant to firm size, has been subject to numerous empirical tests. Studies linking firm size 
and age to growth have also produced a number of stylized facts (Wagner, 1992). For small 
and new firms there is substantial evidence suggesting that growth is negatively related to firm 
size and age (Hall, 1987; Wagner, 1992 and 1994; Mata, 1993, and Audretsch, 1995). 
However, for larger firms, particularly those having attained the minimum efficient scale 
(MES) level of output, the evidence suggests that firm growth is unrelated to size and age. 
An important finding of Audretsch (1991 and 1995) and Audretsch and Mahrnood 
(1995) is that although entry may still occur in industries characterized by a high degree of 
scale economies, the likelihood of survival is considerably less. People will start new firms in 
an attempt to appropriate the expected value of their new ideas, or potential innovations, 
particularly under the entrepreneurial regime. As entrepreneurs gain experience in the market 
they learn in at least two ways. First, they discover whether they possess the right stuff, in 
terms of producing goods and offering services for which sufficient demand exists, as well as 
whether they can product that good more efficiently than their rivals. Second, they learn 
whether they can adapt to market conditions as well as to strategies engaged in by rival firms. 
In terms of the first type of learning, entrepreneurs who discover that they have a viable firm 
will tend to expand and ultimately survive. But what about those entrepreneurs who discover 
that they are either not efficient or not offering a product for which their is a viable demand? 
The answer is, It depends -- on the extent of scale economies as well as 0 1 1  conditions of 
demud. The consequences of not being able to grow will depend, to a large degree, on the 
extent of scale economies. Thus, in markets with only negligible scale economies, firms have a 
considerably greater likelihood of survival. However, where scale economies play an important 
role the consequences of not growing are substantially more severe, as evidenced by a lower 
likelihood of survival. 
6 Compensating Factor Differentials 
How are the new f m s ,  many of which operate at a suboptimal scale of output, able to 
exist? The answer according to the studies on post-entry survival and growth is that they 
cannot -- at least not indefinitely. Rather, they must growth to at least approach the MES level 
of output. An alternative answer is provided by recent studies focusing on the relationship 
between firm size, age and employee compensation (Audretsch, 1995). By deploying a strategy 
of compensating factor differentials, where factor inputs are both deployed and remunerated 
differently than they are by the larger incumbent enterprises, suboptimal scale enterprises are to 
some extent able to offset their size-related cost disadvantages. 
Just as it has been found that the gap between the MES and firm size lowers the 
likelihood of survival, there is evidence suggesting that factors of production, and in particular 
labor, tend to be used more intensively (that is, in terms of hours worked) and remunerated at 
lower levels (in terms of employee compensation). Taken together, the empirical evidence on 
survival and growth combined with that on wages and firm size suggests how it is that small, 
suboptimal scale enterprises are able to exist in the short run. In the initial period of learning, 
during which time the entrepreneur discovers whether he has the right st~rff and whether he is 
able to adapt to market conditions, new firms are apparently able to reduce the cost of 
production in order to compensate for their small scale of production. 
In the current debate on the relationship between employment and wages it is typically 
argued that the existence of small firms which are sub-optimal within the organization of an 
industry represents a loss in economic efficiency. This argument is based on a static analysis, 
however, When viewed through a dynamic lens a different conclusion emerges. One of the 
most striking results is the finding of a positive impact of firm age on productivity and 
employee compensation, even after controlling for the size of the firm. Given the strongly 
confirmed stylized fact linking both firm size and age to a negative rate of growth (that is the 
smaller and younger a firm, that faster it will grow but the lower is its likelihood of survival), 
this new finding linking firm age to employee compensation and productivity suggests that not 
only will some of the small and sub-optimal firms of today become the large and optimal firms 
of tomorrow, but there is at least a tendency for the low productivity and wage of today to 
become the high productivity and wage of tomorrow. 
7 Industrial Organization through an Evolutionary Lens 
What emerges from the new theories and empirical evidence on innovation and industry 
evolution is that markets are in motion, with a lot of firms entering the industry and a lot of 
firms exiting out of the industry (Dosi et al., 1995). But is this motion horizontal, in that the 
bulk of firms exiting are comprised of firms that had entered relatively recently, or vertical, in 
that a significant share of the exiting firms had been established incumbents that were displaced 
by younger firm? In trying to shed some light on this question, Audretsch (1995) proposes two 
different models of the evolutionary process of industries over time. Some industries can be 
best characterized by the model of the conical revolving door, where new businesses enter, but 
where there is a high propensity to subsequently exit fiom the market. Other industries may be 
better characterized by the metaphor of the forest, where incumbent establishments are 
displaced by new entrants. Which view is more applicable apparently depends on three major 
factors -- the underlying technological conditions, scale economies, and demand. Where scale 
economies play an important role, the model of the revolving door seems to be more 
applicable. While the rather starting result discussed above that the startup and entry of new 
businesses is apparently not deterred by the presence of high scale economies, a process of firm 
selection analogous to a revolving door ensures that only those establishments successfbl 
enough to grow will be able to survive beyond more than a few years. Thus the bulk of new 
entrants that are not so successfbl ultimately exit within a few years subsequent to entry. 
There is at least some evidence also suggesting that the underlying technological regime 
influences the process of firm selection and therefore the type of firm with a higher propensity 
to exit. Under the entrepreneurial regime new entrants have a greater likelihood of making an 
innovation. Thus, they are less likely to decide to exit from the industry, even in the face of 
negative profits. By contrast, under the routinized regime the incumbent businesses tend to 
have the innovative advantage, so that a higher portion of exiting businesses tend to be new 
entrants. Thus, the model of the revolving door is more applicable under technological 
conditions consistent with the routinized regime, and the metaphor of the forest, where the 
new entrants displace the incumbents -- is more applicable to the entrepreneurial regime. 
Why is the general shape of the firm-size distribution not only strikingly similar across 
virtually every industry -- that is, skewed with only a few large enterprises and numerous small 
ones -- but has persisted with tenacity not only across developed countries but even over a 
long period of time? The dynamic view of the process of industry evolution is that new firms 
typically start at a very small scale of output. They are motivated by the desire to appropriate 
the expected value of new economic knowledge. But, depending upon the extent of scale 
economies in the industry, the firm may not be able to remain viable indefinitely at its startup 
size. Rather, if scale economies are anything other than negligible, the new firm is likely to 
have to grow to survival. The temporary survival of new firms is presumably supported 
through the deployment of a strategy of compensating factor differentials that enables the firm 
to discover whether or not it has a viable product. 
The empirical evidence supports such a dynamic view of the role of new firms in 
manufacturing, because the post-entry growth of firms that survive tends to be spurred by the 
extent to which there is a gap between the MES level of output and the size of the firm. 
However, the likelihood of any particular new firm surviving tends to decrease as this gap 
increases. Such new suboptimal scale f m s  are apparently engaged in the selection process. 
Only those firms offering a viable product that can be produced efficiently will grow and 
ultimately approach or attain the MES level of output. The remainder will stagnate, and 
depending upon the severity of the other selection mechanism -- the extent of scale economies 
-- may ultimately be forced to exit out of the industry. Thus, the persistence of an asymmetric 
firm-size distribution biased towards small-scale enterprise reflects the continuing process of 
the entry of new firms into industries and not necessarily the permanence of such small and 
sub-optimal enterprises over the long run. Although the skewed size distribution of firms 
persists with remarkable stability over long periods of time, a constant set of small and 
suboptimal scale firms does not appear to be responsible for this skewed distribution. 
8 Conclusions 
Each of the topics addressed in this paper has provided a snapshot of an important 
aspect of the process of industry evolution, and particular, the role that innovation plays in 
shaping that process. These dynamic aspects involve the startup of new firms, survival, growth, 
the development of a strategy of compensating factor differentials, and the extent to which new 
f m s  displace incumbent enterprises. 
The findamental theory common to all of these themes is that that the dynamic process 
through which industries evolve is shaped, at least to some extent, by three major factors -- 
technology, scale economies and demand. There is, in fact, substantial empirical evidence 
supporting the notion of distinct technological regimes. It can be inferred fi-om this evidence 
that under the routinized regime there tends to be convergence regarding the expected value of 
new ideas, or potential innovations, across agents and decisionmaking hierarchies within the 
industry. By contrast, under the entrepreneurial regime there tends to be much more 
divergence regarding the expected value of new ideas, or potential innovations across agents. 
And it is differences in the extent to which new economic knowledge tends to converge or 
diverge across agents that, to a considerable degree, shapes the patterns of firm demography 
observed across industries. 
As Frank Knight (1 92 1, p. 199) pointed out, uncertainty is the result of possessing only 
partial or bounded knowledge: "The essence of the situation is action according to opinion, of 
greater or less foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect 
information, but partial knowledge." In fact, it is the findamental condition of incomplete 
knowledge that leads Arrow (1974 and 1985) to focus on the firm as an organization whose 
main distinction is processing information. As March and Simon (1993, p. 299) argue, 
"Organizations process and channel information." But as Arrow (1985, p. 303) emphasizes, 
"The elements of a firm are agents among whom both decision making and knowledge 
dispersed.. .Each agent observes a random variable, sometimes termed a signal.. .Each agent 
has a set of actions fiom which choice is to be made ... We may call the assignment of signals to 
agents the information structure and the choice of decision rules the decision structure." 
Arrow goes on to note that the cost of acquiring that signal or information is nontrivial. 
How will economic agents, and ultimately hierarchical organizations, respond when 
confronted by incomplete knowledge? Knight's (1921, p. 24.1) answer was "dfierently," 
because agents diEer "in their capacity by perception and inference to form correct judgments 
as to the future course of events in the environment." Which is to say that different economic 
agents confronted by the same signal, in Arrow's terms (1985), or simply incomplete 
information, in Knight's terms, will respond differently because they have a different set of 
experiences from which to evaluate that incomplete information. 
March and Simon (1993) argue that one of the main functions of an organization is to 
filter both the signal, or information, and the response in a way that is not only efficient, but 
also unique to that organization. They do this by shaping the goals and loyalties of those agents 
participating in the organization; for example, "They create shared stories -- an organization 
ethos that includes common beliefs and standard practices" (March and Simon, 1993, p. 300). 
And they offer incentives for conduct that is consistent with the organizational goals. 
Like Nelson and Winter (1982), March and Simon (1993, p. 309) emphasize the role of 
established routines in the functioning of organizations: "Organizations turn their own 
experience as well as the experience and knowledge of others into rules that are maintained 
and implemented despite turnover in personnel and without necessary c'omprehension of their 
bases. As a result, the processes for generating, changing, evoking, and forgetting rules 
become essential in analyzing and understanding organizations." 
As long as new information is consistent with the routines established in an 
organization, it will be processed by economic agents and a decision-making hierarchy in a 
manner that is familiar. New information under the routinized regime is familiar turf for 
organizations. A more fundamental problem arises, however, when the nature of that new 
information is such that it can no longer be processed by the familiar routines. Under these 
circumstiinces the organizational routines for searching out new relevant information and 
making (correct) decisions on the basis of that information break down. And it is under such 
knowledge conditions that divergences tend to arise not only among economic agents in 
evaluating that information, but between agents and organizational hierarchies. 
If each economic agent were identical, such divergences in beliefs would not arise. The 
greater the degree of heterogeneity among agents, the greater the tendency will be for beliefs in 
evaluating uncertain information to converge. But individuals are not homogeneous. Rather, 
agents have varied personal characteristics and different experiences that shape the lens 
through which each agent evaluates where to get new information and how to assess it. That 
is, reasonable people confronted by the same information may evaluate it very differently, not 
just because they have different abilities, but because each has had a different set of life 
experiences which shapes the decisionmaking process. 
Thus, to some extent, the phenomenon of a new firm being established represents not 
just imperfect information, but a diverse population of economic agents. That is, diversity in 
the population of economic agents may ultimately lead to diversity in the types of firms 
populating the industrial structure. And to some extent, these diverse firms represent 
experiments based on differing visions about what should be produced and how it should be 
produced. 
Diversity, however, may also be the source of the high degree of turbulence that is also 
apparently characteristic of at least the United States, if not of all leading developed nations.18 
That is industrial markets are characterized by a high degree of churning. It should, however, 
be emphasized that there is to date no evidence that the industrial structure has actually 
become more turbulent over time, even if that may be true. Without undertaking the 
painstaking statistical research to compare the degree to which the structure of industries is 
characterized by turbulence has changed over long periods of time, such conjectures remain 
18 For a direct analysis of the degree of turbulence in industrial markets, see Acs and Audretsch (1990 and 
1993) for the United States, Invernizzi and Revelli (1993) for Italy, and Beesley and Hamilton (1984) for Great 
Britain. 
just that -- conjectures. After all, the observation that the structure of industries, at least in the 
United States, tends to be remarkably fluid and turbulent is not new. Before the country was 
even half a century old, Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1835, reported, "What astonishes me in the 
United States is not so much the marvelous grandeur of some undertakings as the innumerable 
multitude of small ones. "Ig 
The new learning on technological regimes and industry demography suggests that, 
with respect to the dynamic patterns of firms over time, there is, in fact, no tendency that can 
be generalized. Rather, the dynamic nature in which firms and industries tend to evolve over 
time varies substantially from industry to industry. And it is apparently differences in the 
knowledge conditions and technology underlying the specific industry, that is the nature of 
innovative activity, that account for variations in industry evolution across markets. 
l 9  Quoted from Business Week, Bonus Issue, 1993, p. 12. 
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